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1 The construction of the independent Indian State was built on a plurality of pre-existing
legal orders pertaining both to public law—whereby the multiple principalities under the
paramountcy  of  the  British  Raj retained  a  wide  legislative,  executive  and  judicial
autonomy—and  private  law,  notably  through  a  personal  legal  system  under  which
different  communities  were subject  to  their  respective  norms within specific  subject
matters—mainly familial relations and the administration of religious institutions.
2 Despite  this  legal  motley,  India  has  managed  over  its  relatively  short  history  as  an
independent Nation-State to move towards uniformization. In this regard, uniformization
does not imply strict uniformity. India being a federation, regional States were granted
certain prerogatives in the legislative process relating to their areas of responsibility,1
whilst  Parliament  has  also  limited  the  scope  of  certain  centralized  acts  so  as  to
accommodate  local  specificities,  as  well  as  legitimizing  non-State  normative  bodies.2
Notwithstanding the inherent diversity resulting from this architecture, the legal frame
remains however within the canons of a modern State—which consists in a positivistic
and hierarchical normative system, where sovereignty ultimately lies with the Indian
people through the instrument of the Constitution and its unifying agency.3
3 In recent years, the concept of legal pluralism has enabled a newly founded academic
debate on the actual  effectiveness of  this uniform frame,  wondering if  it  was indeed
India’s  founding fathers’  initial  intention.  However,  this  discussion remains primarily
fixated on implementation (or the lack of it) and the existence of alternative legalities
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(mainly through anthropological data).4 Little attention is in fact paid to State organized
pluralism,  which  is  the  existence  of  duly  recognized  and  competing  sovereignties
entrenched in a single positivistic legal frame.
4 Through the study of the peculiar status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter
J&K) within the Indian Constitution,  this article seeks to present such an instance of
competing sovereignties, to then explore the repercussions of this particular institutional
framework within the day-to-day judicial experiences of Kashmiri litigants in Srinagar.
This approach thus insists on the importance of constitutional design within the broader
elaboration—and unification—of civil law,5 and aims at demonstrating its direct impact
on society within day to day litigation.
5 Hence, the legal architecture pertaining to the accession and subsequent status of J&K
within the Indian Union will first be presented, before exploring the latter’s impact on
the administration of disputes at the grass-root level,  based on exploratory fieldwork
undertaken by the author in Srinagar during the summer of 2012.6
 
The place of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian
Constitution
The peculiar accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union
6 The dismemberment  of  the British Raj into two separate  Dominions in 1947 left  the
former princely States with the option of either joining Pakistan or India. It is worth
remembering that for the most part these States had the attributes of sovereign entities
that had merely been under the protection of the British Empire. In fact, Jammu and
Kashmir already had its own Constitution,7 detailing the executive, legislative and judicial
powers of  the Maharaja,  whilst  organizing the judiciary through a High Court  and a
“Board of Judicial Advisors” inspired by the British framework.8 When midnight struck on
15 August, J&K had de jure full legislative and judicial powers, and as such could have
asserted its own independence.9 The geopolitical situation of the time combined with
Maharaja  Hari  Singh’s  indecision  as  to  which  Dominion  to  join  decided  otherwise.10
However, J&K’s sensitive geographical position between the newly formed Pakistan and
India allowed it to wield more leverage as to its future status. The Instrument of Accession of
Jammu and Kashmir (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:227), which was rapidly accepted by Lord
Mountbatten (then Governor General of the Dominion of India), had therefore to be taken
into account in the drafting of the future Indian Constitution.11
7 Indeed, the Instrument of Accession states:
3. I [Maharaja Hari Singh] accept the matters specified in the schedules here to as
the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature [of India] may make
law for this State …
6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to make any
law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land for any purpose …
7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to be a commitment in any way as to
acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter
into  arrangement  with  the  Governments  of  India  under  any  such  future
Constitution.
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in and over
this State, … or the validity of any law at present in force in this State (Teng, Bhatt,
and Kaul 2006:227).
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8 The schedule only gives power to the Dominion in matters relating to defense, external
affairs and communications. Moreover, it affirms that although India would be given
jurisdictional powers over the aforementioned matters, it could only do so within the
existing State court system, hence not recognizing any jurisdiction to a higher Dominion
court (i.e. the Federal Court of India and the Privy Council).
9 Hence J&K, although attached to India, retained most of its sovereignty, only transferring
certain matters to the central State. At this stage, J&K kept control over the status of its
citizens12 as well as jurisdictional monopoly over civil and criminal matters.13 Moreover,
by  not  automatically  recognizing  the  future  Constitution  of  India,  it  enshrined  the
principle that the State would still be governed by its own constitutional framework. It
was for the Constitution of India to uphold and regulate this dual system.14
10 As a consequence, only articles 1 and 370 of the Indian Constitution directly apply to J&K,
article 370 specifically dealing with the relations between J&K and India:
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,
1. The provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
2. The power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to
1. Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with
the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters
specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the
Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature
may take laws for that State; and
2. Such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of
the State, the President may by order specify … (Constitution of India 1950)
11 Hence,  any  extension  of  India’s  jurisdiction  beyond what  is  already  specified  in  the
Instrument of Accession shall beforehand seek the approval of the State government and
J&K’s own constituent assembly.15
12 As such The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950 was issued,
and extended Parliament’s jurisdiction over matters in the Union List (Seventh Schedule, 
Constitution of  India 1950), as well  as  the application of  a  number of  articles  of  the
Constitution. This resulted in a political crisis between the government of India and that
of  J&K,  ultimately solved by the Delhi  Agreement of  24 July 1952 concluded by both
governments, where the special status of J&K was confirmed, along with its complete
internal autonomy.16
13 The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 implemented this agreement
with  the  approval  of  the  J&K  government.  While  progressively  extending17 the
jurisdiction of Parliament and the Indian Constitution, it also amended or restricted the
application of specific articles of the latter in regards to the specificity of J&K.18
14 J&K enacted a new Constitution in 1956, where it reiterated its inclusion within the Indian
Union (art. 3). Yet the goal of this constitution is the “pursuance of the accession of this
State [J&K] to India …, to further define the existing relationship of the State with the
Union of India as an integral part thereof” (Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 1956:
Preamble). As such, if J&K is territorially an integral part of India, its legal integration on
the other hand is still in “pursuance.” In other words, the Constitution of India remains
an extraneous norm which only applies by virtue of the Instrument of Accession, the Delhi
Agreement and ultimately the J&K Constitution. J&K vows to be an integral part of India,
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benefiting  from the  latter’s  protection  and  advantages  as  rights,  whilst  picking  and
choosing the duties the “motherland” otherwise imposes on the rest of the country.19
15 How then can the relationship between India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir be
defined? A dual constitutional system is at play here, where two distinct sovereignties
have organized their relationship beyond the scope of federalism. Normative hierarchy is
blurred, as the Constitution of India is but an empty vessel in regards to J&K—where only
the The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 holds force. Although
modeled on and by the Indian Constitution, it is an entirely separate instrument in which
both sovereignties have agreed to share and devolve power to one another.
 
Jammu and Kashmir as a transitional State with sui generis status?
16 Jammu and Kashmir’s relationship with the Indian Union is not without similarities to
other  legal  scenarios,  which  have  for  the  most  part  grown  out  of  de-colonization.
However, it remains peculiar in many aspects, and does not find automatic parallels to
other institutional frameworks linking one territory to another.
17 Indeed,  it  cannot  be  characterized as  a  free  association of  sovereign States,  such as
defined by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960 in its Principle
VII.20 J&K does have its own constitution and both the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi
Agreement could be qualified as “international” instruments, whilst as stated above the
“individuality and cultural characteristics” of J&K have been preserved within the Indian
Constitution; however, if it kept part of its sovereignty, it is not independent as such and
furthermore  seeks  to  become an “integral  part”  of  the  Indian Union as  per its  own
constitution whereby its citizens are Indian nationals themselves.
18 Notwithstanding, to seek greater integration is not the same as being integrated. As such,
J&K cannot be characterized as integrated into India under international law. Indeed, the
latter would imply equal status between citizens of both territories (UN General Assembly
1960: principle VII), and as mentioned above J&K’s permanent residents are immune to
article 14 of the Indian Constitution, whilst their privileges are not limited only to the
acquisition of land, but also grant them priority for most local government jobs and the
judiciary.  Integration,  although it  is  an aim,  is  therefore far from being a completed
process.
19 This  partial  integration  seems  to  be  explained  by  a  difference  in  legal  treatment
pertaining  to  J&K’s  population  on  the  one  hand  (permanent  residents  being  fully
incorporated to India through a common nationality),  and its  territory on the other
(where India’s sovereignty does not fully extend). Nonetheless, if such dichotomy can also
be found within other  legal  architectures—such as  that  pertaining to  Puerto Rico in
regards to the United States—strong differences persist. Indeed, unlike J&K and India,
there is no reciprocity in the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. Any
extension  of  US  legal  provisions  does  not  need  the  concurrence  of  Puerto  Rico’s
legislature. Unlike “free association,” Puerto Ricans as US citizens do participate in US
legal  life,  much  like  Kashmiris  in  relation  to  India.  But  Puerto  Rico  can  hardly  be
considered a separate legal entity through which accession to the United States can be
negotiated and formalized; the island is but a mere “possession” of the latter,21 and if its
population has acquired some rights, the territory in itself has not.
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20 In light of its post-colonial history, J&K’s status within the Indian Union is perhaps closer
to another post-colonial experiment, namely France in relation to New Caledonia. Indeed,
the latter occupies similarly a special place within the French Constitution,22 which was
similarly the result  of  a  negotiation process.23 Despite a  radically different aim (New
Caledonia heading towards self-determination and J&K towards becoming an “integral
part”  of  the  Indian  Union),  similarities  are  nevertheless  striking.  Indeed,  both
frameworks have sprung out of inter-governmental agreements, which have in turn been
incorporated into a constitutional framework resulting in sui generis statuses organized
through special  legal instruments (loi  organique n°99–209 and Constitution (Application to
Jammu  and  Kashmir)  Order,  1954),  granting  citizenship  (falling  short  of  a  nationality),
within which are attached particular rights in regards to personal status and property, as
well as a specific institutional architecture.24
21 J&K’s legal status within the Indian Union as sui generis remains by definition hard to
grasp, as it does not easily fit into pre-conceived legal categories, whether through an
international or comparative lens. Thriving towards integration within the Indian Union,
it  does  however  have  the  legal  capacity  to  both  limit  its  pace  and  retain  some
prerogatives.  Notwithstanding,  it  remains  for  a  large  part  virtual  as  far  as
implementation is concerned. One cannot ignore India’s de facto political and military
influence over  the  State.25 But  India’s  de  jure capacity  to  influence J&K’s  legal  order
remains constrained, and this despite political pressure from the central government.26
22 Nevertheless,  in  their  daily  litigation  over  private  matters,  the  people  of  J&K  find
themselves  forced  to  navigate  between  these  different  and  sometimes  contradictory
constitutional frameworks.
 
Snapshot of legal administration in J&K: Indian
influences and disparities
23 The autonomy of J&K within the Indian Union becomes apparent to outsiders visiting the
State. Indeed, one soon realizes that Indian cell phones will not work in Kashmir, nor
would one easily find an internet café as would be the case in any other large Indian city.
27 Most familiar institutions (banks, insurance companies, coffee shops etc…) bear a local
denomination and one fails  to recognize the pan-Indian branches one expects in the
capital of a regional State. However, the daily judicial inner workings of Srinagar do not
induce a similar sense of “exoticism,” as the proceedings follow their course much in the
same manner as in the rest of India. Moreover, despite J&K’s gradual legal integration,
there does not seem to be any reluctance on the part of Kashmiri litigants to trust and use
what could be described as an “imported” judicial administration. Through exploratory
fieldwork, which does not purport to be exhaustive nor generalizable, one can however
point to a few hypotheses as to the existence of this apparent paradox, and its links to
J&K’s status within the Indian Union.
 
A legal integration intended to decrease the burden of pending
cases
24 As aforementioned, the judicial organization of J&K is on a par with that of the rest of the
country,  consisting of Magistrate’s Courts—hearing small  claims and criminal matters
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(with the exception of narcotics), District Courts—competent for civil matters as well as
narcotics—and a High Court, which itself is subordinated to the Indian Supreme Court.
The  Central  Administrative  Tribunal  (which  is  competent  notably  in  regards  to  tax
litigation) is however based in Chandigarh and holds a two day session in Srinagar twice a
month. J&K has the particularity of having two capitals (Jammu and Srinagar) and as
such, judges often travel from one location to the other.28
25 This  judicial  dichotomy  only  accentuates  the  burden  the  judiciary  otherwise  faces,
especially  at  the  lower  level,  where  for  instance  the  Magistrate’s  Courts  deal  with
approximately 80 cases a day,  a burden which forces the judges to multi-task during
hearings—preparing the next case whilst listening to testimonies and arguments from
another.29 According to the Chief Magistrate, this state of affairs can be explained both on
procedural grounds, as every police statement must be confronted in open Court, and as a
Kashmiri  singularity  whereby  advocates’  fees  are  calculated  pro  rata  the  number  of
appearances in Court, thus inciting them to ask for multiple continuances. The situation
is different in Jammu, where fees are usually agreed upon in advance.30 This sometimes
translates  into  slightly  more  “aggressive”  pleadings  by  advocates  in  Srinagar,  who
sometimes put forward the illegitimacy of “Indian justice” in Kashmir.31
26 Nonetheless,  the  judicial  system  in  Kashmir  seems  to  be  largely  accepted  by the
population, as the sheer number of cases pending indicates. The latter is in fact the main
concern of the judiciary, far ahead of ontological questions about its legitimacy. As such,
alternative  dispute  resolution  fora, such  as  the  Muslim Court  of  the  Mufti  Azam of
Kashmir, are more often than not used in conjunction with the official justice system, and
not against it.32
27 A Senior  Advocate  from the J&K High Court  explains  this  general  acceptance of  the
judicial system by arguing that the latter is in fact more British than Indian, furthermore
pointing out  that  however “colonial”  and “Christian” it  may be,  there was no other
alternative model available at this stage.33 As aforementioned, both substantively and
procedurally, J&K’s administration of justice had already been reformed along the British
model before its integration within the Indian Union. In this regard, J&K legal codes offer
but minor differences compared to the Indian ones. Nonetheless,  the fact that Indian
statutes do not automatically apply in J&K has allowed for a number of norms to still be
enforceable in the State, whilst having been repealed in the rest of the country. This is
notably  the  case  in  the  field  of  family  law.  However,  the  growing  legal  substantive
harmonization taking place in recent years has been met with scarce resistance. A recent
example pertaining to enforceability of Muslim personal law in J&K suggests that such
implicit acceptance seems again to lie on the grounds of efficiency above all else.
28 India and J&K have retained from the British Raj a personal legal system, under which in
certain subject matters (mainly pertaining to family relations) the applicable law will be
that of  one’s  ascribed community rather than the territorial  law of  the State,  unless
expressly specified. The Muslim Personal  Law (Shariat)  Application Act,  1937 governs the
family  relations  of  Indian  Muslims,  regardless  of  any  customs  they  might  otherwise
adhere to.34
29 However,  the  1937  Act  did  not  extend to  J&K,  which had always  recognized certain
customs  otherwise  repugnant  to  Islamic law,  particularly  in  matters  of  succession—
namely the concept of Dokhtare Nashin under which a daughter who did not leave the
familial home upon marriage is entitled to the same share as a son, and that of Pisar
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Pawarda recognized as full adoption.35 Unlike in India, J&K’s personal legal system had
never been harmonized based on religious affiliation.
30 A question then arose as to whether Islamic law could nonetheless override customary
provisions  based  on the  fundamental  right  to  profess  one’s  religion,  secured  by  the
Constitution of India (art. 25) and applicable to J&K through the Constitution (Application to
Jammu  &  Kashmir)  Order,  1954.  In  Mst.  Khatji  v.  Abdul  Razak  Sufi (1977)  the  appellant
contested the Pisar Pawarda status of the respondent and hence her share in her deceased
father’s estate, notably on the grounds that the Islamic law of succession should strictly
apply and failure to for it do so would be an infringement upon her freedom of religion.
However,  the  court  qualified  the  right  to  profess one’s  religion as  not  absolute,  the
constitution itself providing that it could be modified so as to “[regulate] or [restrict] any
economic,  financial,  political  or  other  secular  activity  which may be  associated with
religious  practice”  (Constitution of  India  1950:  article 25  (2)(a)).  Transfer  of  property
upon inheritance being qualified as an “economic” activity, the court considered that J&K
enactments could override the application of Islamic law, notably in their recognition of
custom as valid law under the Sri Pratap Jammu and Kashmir Laws Consolidation Act, 1977
[1920 AD].
31 Forty years later, and as an apparent sign of greater integration into the Indian legal
framework, the State legislature would nonetheless adopt the J&K Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act,  2007—an almost identical version of the central Act of 1937.36
Provisions recognized as valid under the Sri Pratap Consolidation Act (1977) are therefore
repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the 2007 legislation (s. 3), such as the
aforementioned customary laws.
32 However, the reason behind the adoption of Muslim Personal Law as general law—and
moreover the latter’s overriding effect on customary law—does not appear to stem from
the will for greater legal harmonization with the Indian legal order. Rather, its inception
lies in an obiter dictum of Imtiaz Hussain J. In Yaqoob Laway and Ors v. Gulla and Anr (2005).
The learned judge was faced with a case that was initiated in 1974 and dragged along for
thirty years, notably because of the difficulty in determining both the applicability and
the substantive provisions of customary law.37 After deciding the case Hussain J. went on
to state:
The Court [J&K High Court in a previous case]38 suggested that the legislature of the
State  should  take  an  early  opportunity  of  clearly  expressing  itself  by  means  of
proper enactment,  whether in matters  relating to succession and other matters
which came up before the court of law from day to day Personal Law of the parties
should be made applicable or custom and if so what should be that custom in a
particular matter. It appears the State Legislature has not shown any response to
the suggestion of the court. But since the problem is persisting one, it is high time
the Legislature of the State may take not of the suggestions of the Full Court [sic] (
Yaqoob Laway and Ors v. Gulla and Anr 2005).
33 As the learned judge remarked, customary law had not been properly recorded and its
determination was therefore prone to “endless litigation” (Yaqoob Laway and Ors v. Gulla
and Anr 2005), given the likelihood of appeals. Although Hussain J. does not advocate for
Muslim Personal Law to override customary law, the State legislature probably found it to
be an easier solution than to order a compilation of all the customs prevalent in J&K. The
2007 Act would then appear to have been drafted not so much with the intention of a
greater legal integration with the Indian normative frame, but rather as a response to
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facilitate the treatment of the growing number of pending cases, which is confirmed to be
the leading concern of both litigants and judicial officers at the ground level.
34 Therefore,  in  light  of  both  its  British  origin  and  the  goal  of  smoothening  the
administration of justice with greater legal certainty and security, the substantive legal
integration of J&K into the Indian legal framework does not seem to be a problem for the
ordinary Kashmiri litigant. The question of the applicable norm does in fact appear to
matter far less than the one who enforces it: i.e. permanent residents.
 
Who delivers justice, a Kashmiri affair
35 Permanent  residency  in  J&K  grants  a  legal  person  certain  privileges  regarding  the
acquisition of  land and priority of  employment within the State;  a  problem however
inevitably arises as to if and when such status may be revoked. The question was put
before the J&K High Court in State of J&K v. Sawhney (2003). Several cases were dealt with
in this single judgment. All had in common the determination of the status of a woman
who, whilst being born as a J&K permanent resident, had married a non-resident. Prior
decisions39 had considered that a married woman was deemed to take the domicile of her
husband,  and  based  on  a  territorial  approach  to  permanent-residency,  would  hence
automatically  forgo  her  status  and  the  rights  it  conferred.40 The  decisions  were
challenged notably on the grounds of  a  breach of  the fundamental  right  to  equality
recognized by the Constitution of India (art. 14). If the High Court confirmed the non-
applicability of the Constitution of India in regards to the determination of permanent
residency,41 it  nonetheless  decided  the  case  in  accordance  with  its  broad  principle.
Indeed, it considered that if permanent residency can be acquired through marriage,42
this could not be construed negatively so as to revoke the status of an already-recognized
permanent-resident-by-birth.  It  further  considered  that  the  restrictions  to  the
acquisition of immovable property by non-residents did not include inherited property
(which is transferred but not acquired), given the over-riding nature of personal law in
governing this specific subject matter.
36 The reasoning of the High Court demonstrates both the influence and ambivalence of
J&K’s status within the Indian Union, and its repercussions on the minutest of disputes
relating  to  “every  day”  litigation.  If  in  fine this  decision  relaxes  the  scope  of  the
permanent resident’s status and its privileges, putting it on par with Indian constitutional
principles,  it  does  so through a  rationale  entirely internal  to  J&K’s  legal  order,  thus
enshrining the latter’s autonomy.43 One could thus put forward the hypothesis that the
High  Court  was  in  fact  pursuing  two  distinct  goals  within  its  decision,  whose
repercussions far outreach the scope of land rights.
37 The  first  was  to  justify  the  status  of  permanent  residents  in  regards  to  the  Indian
Constitution, for notwithstanding its effects on property, it also severely restricts the
access  of  non-residents  to  administrative  jobs,  notably  in  the judiciary.  Observations
during fieldwork showed that despite sometimes “aggressive” pleading remarks, whereby
“Indian laws” were argued to be “illegitimate,” the impartiality of judicial officers was
not however questioned. Moreover, several interviewees emphasized the importance of
the administration of justice in J&K being an internal affair, in other words to be decided
amongst Kashmiris. This general impression does in fact transpire institutionally, as well
as  in  the  judiciary’s  relations  with  non-official  adjudicating  bodies.  Indeed,  as
aforementioned,  the  relations  between judges  and  the  Court  of  the  Mufti  Azam are
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cordial:  the  former  accepting  alternative  dispute  resolution  fora  which  would  help
alleviate the burden otherwise put on the Courts. In the same manner, the accent put on
conciliation transpires institutionally,  notably in the setting up of a “Women’s Police
Station” in 1998, specifically targeted at women who may be reluctant to give testimony
in front of male police officers.44 It deals almost exclusively with matrimonial disputes,
and emphasizes the importance of out-of-Court settlements. As such, only 50 cases were
transferred to the Magistrate’s Court in 2011.
38 However, the second aim of the High Court judgment is to relax the otherwise stringent
rules on appointments within the legal profession. For while the latter is reserved for
permanent residents, this also has the adverse effect of diminishing the pool of potential
applicants. For example, during the last round of nominations at the Magistrate level in
2010, out of 33 successful candidates, 5 were “fresh out of law school”—which although
permissible under J&K regulations,45 was not on par with the majority of other Indian
States, which more often than not require a minimum of three years of legal practice.46 If
the rationale for lowering the threshold was grounded on evidence that “the best talent
which is available is not attracted to the judicial service” (India Judges’ Association and Ors
v. Union of India and Ors 2002), this mainly referred to the graduates of the newly founded
National Law Universities, situated outside J&K. As observed by the Chief Magistrate in
Srinagar, the possible loss of permanent residency upon leaving J&K only emphasized the
problems of recruitment the lower judiciary otherwise faces, even as he complained of
the  sometimes  poor  representation  litigants  were  offered.47 As  such,  contrary  to
superficial appearances, the High Court’s decision in State of J&K v. Sawhney (2003) seeks in
fact  to  protect  the existence of  permanent  residency,  and indirectly  one of  its  most




39 In his famous ethnography of the French administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’État),
Bruno Latour (2010) defined Law as “fractal.” Even within the minutest of disputes, Law’s
entirety was both engaged and indiscernible from the peculiar statutes or regulations
invoked in any particular case. This article has sought to briefly show such fractality
through the example of Jammu and Kashmir’s legal relationship with the Indian Union.
The  status  of  J&K  within  the  Indian  legal  framework  is  indeed  difficult  to  qualify
according to comparative and international standards, and can at best be characterized
as  sui  generis.  Although  the  State  is  deemed  to  be  an  “integral  part”  of  India,  it
nonetheless retains its own legal order and the Constitution of India does not fully apply
on its territory. The duality of J&K’s legal order is however not limited to the realm of
public law, but also enlists the private field, even at a grass-roots level within every day
litigation.  Exploratory  anthropological  fieldwork  further  tends  to  show  how  J&K’s
growing substantive legal integration into the Indian legal framework is closely linked to
and  largely  accepted  through—on  the  assurance  of  being  administered  by  Kashmiri
judicial officers—the permanent residency status. Thus, the challenges and evolution the
lower judiciary faces in the daily administration of justice cannot be separated from the
overarching  legal  relationship  between  J&K  and  the  Indian  Union.  This  further
demonstrates how enquiries on the cultural and social aspects of Jammu and Kashmir
cannot escape a study of its legality.
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NOTES
1. Subject matters regarding legislative competence have been organized by article 246 of the 
Constitution of India, and divided in its “seventh schedule” between a “Union list,” a “State list”
and a  “Concurrent  list.”  However,  the  central  legislature  retains  residuary  legislative  power
(article 248) and central statutes prevail over State enactments pertaining to “concurrent list”
subject matters (article 254).
2. An example can be found in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 regarding the recognition of custom
in the solemnization of marriage (section 7).  Furthermore, the Constitution of India (Part IX)
recognizes (albeit  defining the extent of their power) Panchayats [Village councils]  whilst  the
Kazis Act, 1880 has allowed regional States to nominate Kazis [Muslim judges] in densely Muslim
populated areas, despite stripping them of any judicial or administrative powers (s. 4). A recent
decision Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India & Ors (2014) has confirmed the purely advisory
nature of both their judgments and legal opinions (fatwā).
3. This  unifying  agency  is  particularly  pregnant  within  (non-binding)  Part  IV—“Directive
Principles of State Policy” of the Constitution of India, especially article 44 relating to the creation
of a “Uniform Civil Code.” Although not formally established, Werner Menski (2008) argues that a
certain level of harmonization has already taken place within the existing personal legal system,
especially in relation to post-divorce maintenance.
4. Gopika Solanki (2011) for instance has defined the fora within which un-official law is defined
and implemented as “doorstep courts.”
5. The impact of constitutional set-ups on the creation of civil law has however been largely
ignored by lawyers and historians alike, who tend to favor a more inductive approach, as Oliver
Haardt (2017) recently pointed out in his doctoral research in relation to German federalism in
the 19th C. and its links to the elaboration of the German Civil Code.
6. It  consisted  of  semi-direct  interviews  with  several  judicial  actors,  non-participatory
observation of judicial proceedings at the Magistrate, District and High-Court levels, as well as
visits to several police stations in Srinagar. It also included an interview with the Mufti Azam of
Kashmir regarding his non-official Muslim Court. The author wishes to thank all the interviewees
for their warm reception, in particular that of Chief Magistrate R. Gupta and Principal district
and session judge M. Shafi Ishan. The author also wishes to thank A. Ali (advocate) and R. Ahmad
Bhat (prosecutor)  for  their  help in moving around the city,  and most  importantly  Justice H.
Imtiyaz Hussain for organizing this fieldwork and without whom it couldn’t have taken place, as
well as the joint program “Just India” for its financial support.
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7. J&K Constitution Act, 1996 [1939 AD], and J&K Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2008 [1951 AD].
8. The Letters Patent conferred to the High Court on 10 September 1943 were modeled on the
ones already in place within the Raj.
9. The drive to full independence has strong historical roots , and is still alive today as Sanjay
Kak’s (2007) documentary-film has shown.
10. The Maharaja’s true intentions remain unclear when his government proposed a Standstill
Agreement to both Pakistan and India on 12 August 1947 (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:223). This
was accepted by Pakistan in a telegram dated 15 August 1947 (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:224);
however,  India  asked  for  negotiations  to  take  place  in  New  Delhi.  On  2  and  3  September,
movements of armed men coming from Pakistan were spotted, and “forced” the Maharaja to
make an Accession Offer to India on 26 October 1947 (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:227) in exchange
for  military  assistance.  The Instrument  of  Accession was  accepted by  Lord Mountbatten on 27
October 1947 (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:229).
11. The geopolitical position of Kashmir did not allow the Indian government to simply annex
this princely state, as Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (then Deputy Prime Minister of India) did for
Junagadh in 1947 and threatened to do in Hyderabad in 1948, both geographically remote from
Pakistan.  Nor  could  it  be  simply  incorporated  within  the  constitutional  framework  after  its
promulgation,  as was the case for Goa (annexed in 1961) and Pondicherry (de facto ceded by
France to India in 1954, and de jure in 1961 through the Treaty establishing cession by the French
Republic to the Indian Union of the French establishments in India of May 28, 1956).
12. Defined as “State Subjects” by the State Subject Definition Notification No. I-L/84 on 20 April
1927 (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:74) by Maharaja Bahadur, incorporated in the Constitution of
1939.
13. J&K indeed has its own Code of Civil Procedure, 1977 (1920 AD), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989
(1933 AD) and Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (1932 AD).
14. Proclamation of Maharaja Yuvraj Karan Singh on 25 November 1949. The next day the Indian
Constitution was adopted by the constituent assembly.
15. However, article 370 remains in force even after the constituent assembly’s dissolution (S.
Mubarik Shah Naqashbandi v.  I.T.O. 1971)—the President of India still retaining the authority to
enact orders to apply or restrict the application of certain provisions of the Indian Constitution,
following the same procedure, that is in concurrence with the Government of J&K (Kundan Lal v.
District Magistrate and Anr 1970), Lakhanpal v. President of India and Ors (1961).
16. See Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Statement to the Constituent Assembly on Delhi Agreement (Teng,
Bhatt, and Kaul 2006:261), and Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement in the Lok Sabha on 24 July 1952
(Gopal 1984:219).
17. Amendment  Orders  from 1954  up  until  today  continue  to  be  issued  in  order  to  further
incorporate J&K’s legal frame into the Indian one. The Order of 1954 extended jurisdiction of
Parliament to all  the matters contained in the “Union List” within the Constitution of India,
while granting J&K a residuary power of legislation for matters not mentioned in the State and
Concurrent  lists  (as  such,  there  is  no  “State  List”  in  regards  to  J&K).  The  Supreme  Court’s
jurisdiction was also extended to J&K in exchange for granting the High Court of the State the
power to issue writs in order to enforce fundamental rights (applicable in J&K).
18. One  of  the  most  notable  is  the  addition  of  article  35A,  which  recognizes  the  status  of
“permanent resident” of J&K as being similar to one of “citizenship”—State of Jammu & Kashmir
and  anr.  v.  Dr.  Susheela  Sawhney (2003)—preventing  it  from  being  declared  void  under  the
provisions of Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Indian Constitution, namely art. 14 (right to
Equality). Another example was to limit the scope of article 3 in regards to J&K (empowering the
central legislature to create or alter the boundaries of existing States—as it did in 1956 along
ethnic and linguistic lines—see State Reorganization Act 1956).
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19. As an example, under the division between general and special laws, the J&K Code of Criminal
Procedure (1989) and Ranbir Penal Code (1989) (as special laws) would supersede the Indian Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Indian Penal Code, 1860—general laws which were subsequently partly
extended  to  J&K  under  the  “Concurrent  list”—as  amended  by  the  Constitution  (Application  to
Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. J&K is not the only State benefiting from special laws (hence non-
residents  cannot  buy  land  in  Himachal  Pradesh,  whilst  they  can  only  buy  small  plots  in
Uttarakhand),  but  the difference lies  in the fact  that  because of  J&K’s  specific  constitutional
status, the central legislature may not amend or repeal such special legislation without J&K’s
prior approval.
20. This involves one independent State devolving part of its sovereignty to another (notably in
the realm of  defense,  monetary  and foreign policy),  as  is  for  instance the case  between the
Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palaos with the United States.
21. Part of the Commonwealth of the United States (art. 4, s. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution of the
United States),  it  has  been defined as  “a  territory  appurtenant  and belonging to  the United
States, but not a part of the United States” (Downes v. Bidwell 1901).
22. Articles 76 and 77 of the Constitution of 1958 have created a transitional legal status for the
islands, defined as sui generis and organized through a special law (Loi organique n°99–209 du 19
mars  1999  relative  à  la  Nouvelle  Calédonie)  which  establishes  both  a  citizenship  (article 4)  and
personal  customary civil  status  for  the Melanesian population (articles 7 to 19).  Furthermore,
although State courts are competent to settle disputes under this particular status, their bench is
composed differently in order to include “customary assessors” (art. 19).
23. In the form of a set of two agreements: Accords de Matignon, (French Government 1988) and
Accords de Nouméa (French Government 1998).
24. For more on this subject, as far as private law is concerned, see Guy Agniel (2008) and Jean-
Yves Faberon (2012) for an institutional perspective.
25. Notably through the special powers given to the Indian Army (and specifically its immunity
from judicial action by State authorities) by the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers
Act,  1990—which  has  however  only  been  extended  to  J&K  and  was  not  conceived  for  this
particular region, but for the North-Eastern part of the country (Armed Forces [Special Powers] Act,
1958).
26. A recent example was given by the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi (then a candidate),
who  during  the  2014  general  election  campaign  called  for  a  debate  on  article 370  of  the
Constitution of India (Fayyaz 2013).
27. One could however suspect the reasons are more connected to security and surveillance,
rather than legal autonomy.
28. As such, upon following hearings at the High Court in Srinagar, one notices that some of the
Justices are not present, but in Jammu, which both limits the number of hearings and incites the
bench to be more assertive towards advocates—notably asking them not to “waste their time”:
non-participatory observation of High Court judicial proceedings, August 29, 2012, Srinagar.
29. Interview with Chief Judicial Magistrate Rajeev Gupta on August 27, 2012, Srinagar. Non-
participatory observation of judicial proceedings at the Magistrate’s Court on August 27 and 28,
2012, Srinagar.
30. Interview with Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  (note 29).  In  that  regard,  he readily  admits  that
certain cases can drag along for years (even though some are prioritized: in the case of older
litigants, women, Scheduled Tribes and Castes, litigants from remote areas or those below the
poverty line), and that the best way to “bury” a case consists in putting forward a lengthy list of
witnesses, who as time goes on will have moved and become impossible to find. The question of
inadequate police reports—which are binding in Court—has also been echoed by prosecutors
(who  are  not  part  of  the  investigation  process),  whilst  knowing  that  certain  cases  are  not
“winnable”: informal interview with five prosecutors, August 28, 2012, Srinagar.
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31. Non-participatory observation of judicial proceedings (note 29). This argument was however
rapidly rebuked by the Chief Magistrate, asking the advocate “not to bring politics into Court.”
However, the fact that it was made in a light-hearted manner suggests it was more of a delaying
tactic than an outright disapproval of the judicial system as a whole.
32. Interview with Principal District and Session Court Judge Mohammad Shafi, August 27, 2012,
Srinagar. The latter points to the practice of forum shopping by certain litigants, who would
approach the Court more likely to grant them the outcome they wished for. Judge Shafi further
remarked that it was not uncommon for litigants who previously sought a decision in the Muslim
Court to then come to the official Court system. Meanwhile, the Mufti Azam of Kashmir stresses
that his Court is not against the official judicial system, whilst nonetheless regretting the lack of
knowledge of certain judges in regards to Islamic family legal issues: interview with the Mufti
Azam of Kashmir, August 30, 2012, Srinagar. However, Judge Shafi did point out that the Shia
minority but rarely uses the official justice system, “sorting things by themselves.”
33. Interview with a Senior Advocate at the High Court, August 29, 2012, Srinagar.
34. Indeed, this Act repealed previous legislative provisions which recognized custom as a valid
choice of law (notably s. 3 of the Oudh Laws Act [1876] and s. 5 of the Punjab Laws Act [1872]).
35. Under classical Islamic law, according to the Ḳur’ān a daughter would inherit only half of a
son’s  share  in  his  presence  (Ḳ 4:11  see  Abdel  Haleem  2004:51),  whilst  full  adoption  is  not
recognized (but rather the concept of foster-parent [Kafala]—drawn from Ḳ 33:4–5 and Ḳ 93:6–11
see Abdel Haleem:266 and 425).
36. The differences lie in the legal treatment of agricultural lands (included in the scope of J&K
Act  [2007],  excluded in  the  central  one)  and testate  succession (on which the J&K Act  stays
silent).
37. This  case  also  revolved  on  matters  pertaining  to  adoption,  which  surfaced  upon  the
succession of the appellant’s father and the qualification of the respondent as pisar pawarda.
38. Mohd. Akbar Bhat v. Mohd. Akhoon (1972).
39. Prakash v. Sahani (1965).
40. Hence certificates  of  permanent residency issued to women by the State would mention
“valid until marriage.”
41. As per Section 4 (j) of the Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order 1954.
42. According to note III of the State Subject Definition Notification No. I-L/84 on April 20, 1927,
under which: “The wife or a widow of a State Subject of any class shall acquire the status of her
husband as State Subject of the same Class as her husband, so long as she resides in the State and
does not leave the State for permanent residence out-side the State” (Teng, Bhatt, and Kaul
2006:74).
43. It is worth noticing that the J&K political scene did not fully grasp this last point. Soon after
the decision, the Jammu and Kashmir Permanent Resident (Disqualification) Bill (Jammu and Kashmir
2004)  was  put  forward  before  the  state  legislature  to  reverse  its  effects.  Although  the  bill
ultimately failed to pass, it remains symptomatic of J&K’s position in regards to its integration
into the Indian Union (see Ashai 2010).
44. As  such,  all  officers  in  the  Police  Station  are  women (except  the  Deputy  Chief):  visit  of
“Women’s Police Station,” August 28, 2012, Srinagar.
45. Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Judicial) Recruitment Rules, 1967.
46. See All  India  Judges’  Association and Ors  v.  Union of  India  and Ors (1993);  however,  the First
National Judicial Pay Commission Report (known as the “Shetty Commission Report”) in 1999
proposed to abolish the three year minimum practice requirement. Whilst the Supreme Court
has accepted this recommendation (see India Judges’ Association and Ors v. Union of India and Ors
(2002),  it  remains  controversial  as  some States  continue to  require  candidates  to  at  least  be
members of the Bar.
47. Interview with Chief Judicial Magistrate (note 29).
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ABSTRACTS
This paper seeks to briefly assess the place of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian Union, as
well as the latter’s repercussions on the daily administration of justice in Srinagar. Although
regional  States have retained certain specificities  and prerogatives under the Constitution of
India, J&K’s status is significantly different. Being the only State with its own constitution, J&K’s
accession to India has been achieved through specific legal instruments granting it a peculiar
type  of  sovereignty.  In  order  to  define  the  relationship  between  India  and  J&K,  this  article
compares similar legal frameworks from a comparative perspective. It submits that J&K belongs
to a  sui  generis legal  category,  similar  to the one New Caledonia currently  enjoys within the
French  Republic.  It  then  seeks  to  explore  how  this  peculiar  status  interacts  with  the
administration  of  justice  at  the  grass-root  level  in  Srinagar.  It  suggests  that  the  overall
acceptance of the judicial system in J&K, as well as its growing integration into the Indian legal
framework is closely linked to concerns about efficiency, and most importantly to the permanent
residency status of its judicial officers.
INDEX
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